Critique of Richard Rorty’s “Anticlericalism and Atheism.”

by C.L. Ramsey

Richard Rorty’s essay comprising chapter one accurately reflects a Postmodern offering to the discussion of truth, knowledge, and reality. In typical Postmodern fashion, he is replete with continual contradiction, presumed premises, and flowery falsehoods, all while ignoring plain logic and common sense. Stripping Scripture from context, contorting it to somehow squeeze into his peculiar paradigm further betrays his blind devotion to a systematic uselessness of propositions that lead nowhere―except maybe to the destruction of those who would embrace them.

According to Alvin Plantinga, though postmodernism is characterized in various ways, some core agreements are: a rejection of classical foundationalism, the claim that there is no objectivity, a pursuit of deconstruction, a claim against absolute truth, truth is made and not discovered, and that all that really matters is power.1 R. Albert Mohler, adds to these themes the death of the meta-narrative, the demise of the text, and the decline of authority.2 Themes such as these are blatant in Rorty’s writings. But in this chapter, a discussion of “truth” and anti-authority sentiments are the thrust. However, his conclusions obviously come from the foundation of these previous themes (Rorty uses an underlying “modest foundationalism,” not the classical type he would deny―although he apparently refuses to distinguish between the two).3

Given these themes as core to Rorty’s view, his writing of anything disqualifies him from legitimacy according to his own view. It would be similar to a believer of determinism seeking to change another’s belief. If our beliefs are dictated already, what’s the point of trying to change what God has sovereignly predetermined? Rorty and all Postmodernists who believe that there is no objective meaning in the written word have no business writing anything. According to them, their words will only mean what the reader brings to them. Furthermore, if one has no right to impose authority on another, why write such things designed to advance their position? Also, how can Rorty say that there is no truth as if that is the truth of the matter? There are many contradictions like these that I will probe more deeply into, but J.P. Moreland sums Rorty’s view up well. In speaking of Postmodernism, he says it is, “the cure that kills the patient, the military strategy that concedes defeat before the first shot is fired, the ideology that undermines its own claims to allegiance.”4

False Premises
Rorty presumes that in “this new climate of philosophical opinion” certain answers are no longer expected. He goes on to imply that there are no answers anyway to the possible pleaching of art and morality, politics and jurisprudence, or religion and natural science.5 Not surprisingly, he dodges questions that lead to where real life is lived. If art is divorced from morality, any obscene, pornographic, or violent content is considered permissible despite the oppressive results of that content on the viewer. This should be important to one claiming that oppression in every form is wrong (of course, “wrong” has no set standard according to Rorty). Without jurisprudence, those in politics (and everywhere) would be free to oppress whomever they could without deterrence or restitution. This negation seems to counter his stance of authority being suspect due to its bent toward oppression. I would think he would champion the issue of justice, especially when keeping those in power in check.

Rorty’s Real Issue
Ultimately, Rorty builds to his real issue, that of religion. He presumes a discord between religion and natural science. However, there is no such discord when speaking of Christianity. In fact, the Bible has never been contradicted by genuine science, and the more scientists discover, the more we see that their discoveries―from the water cycle6, the sun’s motion7, and the earth’s shape8, to atomic theory9 and many more, not to mention the vast archaeological finds―agree with Scripture. Both real science and Christianity are aimed at ultimate reality, as was philosophy at its beginning. In Webster’s 1828 dictionary, within the definition of philosophy was this elaboration:

“The objects of philosophy are to ascertain facts or truth, and the causes of things or their phenomena; to enlarge our views of God and his works, and to render our knowledge of both practically useful and subservient to human happiness.

“True religion and true philosophy must ultimately arrive at the same principle.”10

Christianity and genuine science are naturally interwoven, as are art and morality and jurisprudence and politics. To simply avoid the issue as Rorty does is to remain caught up in philosophical fancies of no substance, offering no answers and no help at all, contradicting his rally to pragmatism.

His seemingly noble suggestion that believers and nonbelievers follow a policy of “live and let live”11 may sound good at first, but how about merely “letting live” those who hold a policy of “live and let’s murder”? His solution of religion being “unobjectionable as long as it is privatized” leaves murderers free to harm whomever they wish if say, Christianity, was relegated from the public square. Claims that religion should not be involved with politics typically occur after political figures have roped issues into politics that are, in actuality religious issues, like ethics, value of existence, life, etc.

Key Contradictions
Despite Rorty’s being religiously “non-musical,” he seems to champion the Christian virtue of charity or love. In fact, he goes so far as to state that history has no ultimate meaning or purpose, but only “the hope that love may prevail.”12 He even applauds Vattimo for stripping Jesus from history and identifying Him with neither truth nor power but only with love.13 However, he does not define the truth of what love is―and doesn’t try. Building upon Vattimo’s removal of Jesus from truth and history, Rorty issues the imperative that religion should retreat from the sphere of the quest for truth. Further contradicting himself yet again, he states that the truth of this conclusion is the lesson learned from the history of Europe and America.14 It is interesting that he espouses a lesson from history, although history, according to him, has no meaning. Furthermore, considering Rorty’s heralding of open-mindedness saying things like, “[open-mindedness] should be fostered for its own sake,”15 his moral imperative regarding religion seems counter to his dogma, especially considering his denial of the existence of a “moral high ground” from which one can make moral judgments and demands in the first place.16

Supporting Vattimo’s agreement with Heidegger that, “the metaphysics of objectivity culminates in a thinking that identifies truth of being with the calculable, measurable and definitively manipulatable object of techno-science,”17 Rorty seemingly changes his viewpoint from postmodernism to modernism. And, redefining terms that are inconvenient for his point, he identifies “rationality” with pursuing universal, intersubjective agreement and identifies “truth” as the outcome from such a pursuit. This premise, he concludes, squeezes religion out of public life and intellectual life as well.18 I don’t know what he does with the scientific truths in the Bible that we continue to “catch up with.” After all, these meet the criteria laid out by Vattimo and Heidegger that Rorty says he supports. But, changing the definition of “rationality” and “truth” is one way to present himself as correct―even though being “correct” or stating the “truth” would leave him only stating what has been agreed upon (according to his definition of “truth”). But, then again, since there is not universal agreement concerning his statements, then, by his own definition, he is propagating untruth (or falsehood). Contrarily, if Rorty’s view of rationality and truth is played out, then all we would have to do is agree that there is no cancer or AIDS,19 and it would be reality. According to Rorty, reality follows universal opinion. For being so non-religious, he sounds a lot like a devout member of the word-of-faith movement which also espouses we can create reality with our agreement and words. This idea of deciding what reality will be simply by agreeing on it is ridiculous. Underlying his opinion is the assumption that religion is irrational. But, as Plantinga points out, there is no genuine solely du jure question, only one of, or intwined with, the de facto question.20

Scripture Out Of Context
I find it strange that, given Rorty’s education and literacy, he can so widely miss the point of even the plainest meaning of Scripture despite the context―but then again, he would say that writing only means what the reader brings to it. For example, he agrees with Vattimo’s misrepresenting Jesus’ kenosis as God’s turning over everything to humans. This is an utter perversion of the term, let alone the event. His bizarre conclusion from this is that secularization is the “constitutive trait of authentic religious experience.”21 This is like saying that the way to make snow whiter is to mix it with dung. As I read Rorty, I’m reminded of Martin Luther’s response to Erasmus. Though unlike Luther with Erasmus, I am not impressed at all with Rorty’s style. Luther conceded to Erasmus in his upstaging eloquence and genius. But, Luther regarded his arguments as so worthless, that in contrasting Erasmus' content with his style, he compared his writing to “peasepods or pieces of dung served up in vessels of gold and silver.”22

Rorty further says that if we would only become more secular, we would somehow better carry out “the Gospel’s promise that God will no longer see us as servants but as friends.”23 The trouble with this statement is that this is not the Gospel’s promise, but a result of the promise. And, this result is dependent upon a condition. The condition is in the same verses misrepresented here from John 15 and is from Jesus Himself. He said to His disciples that they were His friends IF they do what He commands. Rorty’s touting of Vattimo’s reduction of Christianity to love, while leaving the rest to “the non-finality of historical experiences,”24 fails to realize―or admit― that both the command to charity as well as the rest of Jesus’ commands were both given and lived out in historical reality and experience.

Nonsensically, Rorty then lifts up examples from the past that supposedly model Christian love, like Darwin, whose work inspired the Holocaust―that was love? On the other hand, Darwin and those like him should have no problem with the Holocaust, since it would only be “survival of the fittest” in action, improving our “favoured race.” Of course, according to Rorty, if we would but agree that the Holocaust never happened, then it would be so. Rorty lifts up Freud as well and describes him and Darwin as followers of Christ in some sense―nonsense! Freud proposed that God does not really exist at all, but is a result of mere wish-fulfillment. Darwin and Freud having nothing to do with being like Christ.

Rorty states that “truth and knowledge are a matter of social cooperation,”―never mind that this contradicts itself since this proposition itself is not agreed upon―and two paragraphs later he says that both he (with no regard for religion) and Vattimo (raised Catholic with much religious feeling) can both, “cite 1 Corinthians 13 in support of [their] refusal to engage in any such individuous explanation.”25 The problem with this is that 1 Corinthians 13:6 states, “Love does not rejoice in unrighteousness…”―notice the moral implication that Rorty would deny is possible―“...but [love] rejoices in the TRUTH.” Notice that love rejoices in the truth whether we all agree that it does or not.
Earlier in verses 4-5 we see, “love” does not act improperly, envy, and is not conceited. Contrarily, Rorty describes his version of a global civilization of “love” in which he so-typically contradicts himself describing it as both “domination-free” yet, “power would be entirely at the disposal of the free agreement of…” whom, the people? the consensual law? the individual? no, “...the free agreement of a literate and well-educated electorate.”26 So much for domination free. Does he think that this elite would not be tempted to oppress others for personal gain? For being so anti-power and authority believing all power to be bad, he is awfully quick to decide that controlling power should not only exist, but those like himself should ascend the throne.

Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing
This essay smacks of a desperate fool trying to wage word games until he can justify his depravity to himself by tying his mind in such contradiction that true reason cannot penetrate. It also seems that he is trying to manipulate public consensus in order to recast his deception as acceptable. Peter puts it this way, “These people are springs without water, mists driven by a whirlwind. The gloom of darkness has been reserved for them. For uttering bombastic, empty words, they seduce, by fleshly desires and debauchery...They promise them freedom, but they themselves are slaves of corruption.”27 To again quote J.P. Moreland, Rorty’s views are “the cure that kills the patient, the military strategy that concedes defeat before the first shot is fired, the ideology that undermines its own claims to allegiance.”28
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1 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York:Oxford University Press, 2000), 422-423. Afterwards WCB.
2 R. Albert Mohler, “What is Truth?  Truth and Contemporary Culture.” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society; Mar 2005; 48, 1; ProQuest Religion, 66-68.
3 J.P. Moreland, “Truth, Contemporary Philosophy, and the Postmodern Turn.” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society; March 2005; 48, 1, 83-84.
4 J.P. Moreland, 88.
5 Rorty, Richard and Gianni Vattimo,  ed  Santiago Zabala. The Future of Religion (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) 32.
6 Amos 9:6. 7 Psalm 19:4-6. 8 Isaiah 40:22. 9 Hebrews 11:3.
10 Webster, Noah (1828). Rosalie Slater, Ed., American Dictionary of the English Language. (San Francisco, CA:Foundation for American Christian Education, 1967).
11 Zabala, 33.
12 Ibid., 35. 
13 Ibid., 35-36.
14 Ibid., 36.
15 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, p 52. Quoted in Rosalind M. Selby, Comical Doctrine: An Epistemology of New Testament Hermeneutics (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2006), 52.
16 Richard Rorty, Quoted in Rosalind M. Selby, Comical Doctrine: An Epistemology of New Testament Hermeneutics (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2006), 242-43.
17 Zabala, 36.
18 Ibid., 36-37.
19 WCB., 430.
20 Ibid., 169 and other places.
21 Ibid., 35.
22 Henry Worsley, The life of Martin Luther, Vol. 2, (London:Bell and Daldy, 1856), 85.
23 Zabala, 38.
24 Ibid., 38.
25 Ibid., 39.
26 Ibid., 40.
27 2 Peter 2:17-19 HCSB.
28 J.P. Moreland, “Truth, Contemporary Philosophy, and the Postmodern Turn.” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society; March 2005; 48, 1, 88.